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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- PATERNITY -UNWED FATHER'S
RIGHTS-The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that an un-
wed father has standing to seek a declaratory judgment regard-
ing whether he is the father of a child born out of wedlock in
order to determine his legal rights in relation to the child.
In re Mengel, 287 Pa. Super. 186, 429 A.2d 1162 (1981).
In April 1980, James McGarrity filed a petition in the Court of
Common Pleas, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, seeking a de-
claratory judgment that he was the father of a child, Jeffrey,
born December 29, 1979 to Kathy Mengel.' He alleged in his com-
plaint that it was physically possible he was the child's father and
that thee mother so claimed prior to Jeffrey's birth.' McGarrity
requested that blood tests be taken to make this determination
and that appropriate relief be granted if he was found to be the
father.'
The trial court sustained the mother's preliminary objection to
the petition and dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of
action.' On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a
putative father has standing to obtain a declaratory judgment of
his paternity and remanded the case for further proceedings.'
After first determining that the central issue was whether the
petitioner, an unwed father, had standing to seek a declaration
that he was the father of a child born out of wedlock, the court
noted that the doctrine of standing requires the aggrieved party
to demonstrate a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in
the subject matter of the litigation.' This interest must be one
1. In re Mengel, 287 Pa. Super. 186, 429 A.2d 1162 (1981).
2. Id. at 188, 429 A.2d at 1164. Throughout most of her pregnancy, the
respondent claimed petitioner was the father. Shortly before Jeffrey's birth,
however, she denied this allegation.
3. Id.
4. In re Paternity of Jeffrey Mengel, 107 Montg. County L.R. 185 (1980).
5. In re Mengel, 287 Pa. Super. 186, 197, 429 A.2d 1162, 1168 (1980). Judge
Brosky wrote the majority opinion which was joined by Judge Hoffman.
6. Id. at 189, 429 A.2d at 1164. See Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City
of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975), in which a group of parking lot
operators and city residents challenged a City of Pittsburgh ordinance imposing
a tax on all portions of "non-residential parking places." The court held that
these plaintiffs had a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the
litigation and could therefore maintain the action.
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which deserves legal protection.!
The court then examined several recent cases dealing with the
rights of unwed fathers8 and noted that in Pennsylvania unwed
fathers have the statutory right to inherit from their illegitimate
children.9
Based upon this authority the court concluded that an unwed
father does have a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in
the subject matter of the controversy because the determination
that he was the father of a child would confer upon him the
7. 287 Pa. Super. at 189, 429 A.2d at 1164 (quoting K. C. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW, 714 (1951)). &
8. 287 Pa. Super. at 189-90, 429 A.2d at 1164-65. See Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972). The children of an unwed father were made wards of the
state on their mother's death. The Supreme Court held that an unwed father
has a substantial interest in obtaining custody of his children and ruled that the
state's presumption of unfitness of an unwed father and denial of a hearing for
custody violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. In a similar case, State ex. rel. Lewis v. Luthern Social Services of
Wisconsin, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated and remanded sub
nom. In State ex rel. Rothstein v. Luthern Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972),
the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that unwed fathers have no right to cus-
tody of their illegitimate children. The United States Supreme Court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
Stanley. The Wisconsin Supreme Court then ruled an unwed father must be
given notice and a chance to be heard in adoption proceedings. 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207
N.W. 2d 826 (1973). See also Petersen v. Hayes, 252 Pa. Super. 487, 381 A.2d
1311 (1977), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a natural father is
entitled to visit his children after his separation from their mother even though
he has not supported them and is hostile to the mother's new husband. The
court stated that the visitation privileges of a father of illegitimate children
must be determined by the same standards that are applied to fathers of
legitimate children; Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a statute providing that consent of the
mother only is sufficient for adoption of an illegitimate child created an imper-
missible distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers and violated
the state constitutional provision that equality of rights under law shall not be
denied or abridged because of sex.
9. 287 Pa. Super. at 190, 429 A.2d at 1164-65. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2107 (Purdon Supp. 1981) which states:
(a) Child of mother-for purposes of descent by, from and through a
person born out of wedlock, he shall be considered the child of his mother.
(c) Child of father-For purposes of descent by, from and through a
person born out of wedlock, he shall be considered the child of his father
when the identity of the father has been determined in any one of the
following ways:
(1) If the parents of a child born out of wedlock shall have married
each other.
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rights to inherit from his child and the ability to contest his or
her adoption.'
The Court then addressed the appropriateness of McGarrity's
petition for a declaratory judgment." The Court noted that the
Declaratory Judgment Act'" provides for the declaration of
rights, status, and other legal relations and that McGarrity was
seeking to establish his status as a parent which would deter-
mine his legal relation to the child.'3 Also, the court noted the
purpose of the Act is to relieve uncertainties and insecurity with
respect to rights, status, and other legal relations and that it is
to be liberally construed.' Observing that a court may refuse to
grant a declaratory judgment only when it appears the declara-
(2) If during the lifetime of the child, the father openly holds out the
child to be his and receives the child into his home, or openly holds the
child out to be his and provides support for the child which shall be deter-
mined by clear and convincing evidence.
(3) If there is clear and convincing evidence that the man was the
father of the child, which may include a prior court determination of
paternity.
10. 287 Pa. Super. at 190-91, 429 A.2d at 1165.
11. Id. at 191, 429 A.2d at 1165.
12. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7531-7541 (Purdon Supp. 1982). See § 7532
which provides:
Courts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further re-
lief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objec-
tion on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.
The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect,
and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment
or decree.
Id.
13. 287 Pa. Super. at 191, 429 A.2d at 1165. Although no Pennsylvania
cases have involved a situation in which a putative father used a declaratory
judgment action to determine his paternity, the court found two instances
where children sought to determine their paternity and legitimacy through a
declaratory judgment action. See Liddick v. Louden, 52 D. & C. 402 (Perry
County 1945) (jurisdiction exists under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act
of to determine the legitimacy of one claiming under a testamentary trust);
Spencer v. Spencer, 47 D. & C. 192 (Dauphin County 1942) (declaratory judg-
ment may be had to determine whether one claiming rights under a trust con-
ferring benefits upon the lawful issue of a said person is a lawful issue of that
person).
14. 287 Pa. Super. at 191, 429 A.2d at 1165. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7541(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982) which states: "This subchapter is declared to be
remedial. Its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and in-
security with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations, and is to be
liberally construed and administered."
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tion will not settle the uncertainty that gave rise to the litiga-
tion,15 the court concluded that in the present case, granting a
declaratory judgment would indeed terminate the uncertainty. 6
The Court then examined decisions from jurisdictions which
had enacted the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, from which
the Pennsylvania Declaratory Judgment Act was derived. 7
The McGarrity court noted that Pennsylvania has a support
statute which provides for determining paternity. 8 The Court,
however, observed that the statute was not available to McGarri-
ty because the child's mother supported him. 9 The Court empha-
sized that even if the petitioner could seek relief under the Sup-
15. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7537 (Purdon Supp. 1982):
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree
where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not termi-
nate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding, but as
provided in section 7541(b) (relating to effect of alternative remedy), the
existence of an alternative remedy shall not be a ground for the refusal to
proceed under this subchapter.
See also Melnick v. Melnick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A.2d 111 (1942) (when a party
asserts a legal relation, status, right, or privilege in which he has a concrete in-
terest which is challenged by an adverse party, either party may request a de-
claratory judgment provided only that such a judgment will serve to terminate
the controversy).
16. 287 Pa. Super. at 192, 429 A.2d at 1166.
17. Id. See Johannesen v. Pfeiffer, 387 A.2d 1113 (Me. 1978). The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine held that because an unwed father has the right to in-
herit from his child, a putative father could maintain a declaratory judgment ac-
tion to determine his paternity. The court ruled that a putative father should
be permitted to have his status determined while evidence was still available.
See also Slawek v. Strok, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974), where the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a declaratory judgment was a proper
means for a putative father to seek to determine his paternity. The'Wisconsin
Court noted that the state statute dealing with the support of dependents made
provisions for the determination of parentage of illegitimate children, but ruled
that because support action was not available to the putative father, he must be
allowed some other procedure.
18. 287 Pa. Super. at 194, 429 A.2d at 1167. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6704(g) (Purdon 1982), which provides:
Where the paternity of a child born out of wedlock is disputed, the deter-
mination of paternity shall be made by the court without a jury unless
either party demands trial by jury. The trial, whether or not a trial by
jury is demanded, shall be a civil trial and there shall be no right to a
criminal trial on the issue of paternity. The burden of proof shall be by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Id1.
19. 287 Pa. Super. at 194, 429 A.2d at 1167.
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port Act, an alternative remedy was no longer a bar to seeking a
declaratory judgment. ' °
The court next considered McGarrity's request that the trial
court order blood tests pursuant to the Uniform Act on Blood
Tests to Determine Paternity." This Act gives the court power
to order blood tests on the mother, child, and alleged father."
The court also noted that the statute gives a party to a pater-
nity action the right to request blood tests, and interpreted this
language as requiring the trial court to order the tests upon a
party's request." Because the court had concluded McGarrity
had standing to seek a declaratory judgment, it found his re-
quest for blood tests proper, and ruled that the trial court order
them.' 4
The Superior Court then reviewed McGarrity's request that
the trial court join in the action any person who could be the
father if the blood tests proved that he was not. The Court held
that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not give the trial court
such authority" because the action was to determine only
whether or not McGarrity was the father. Therefore the only
persons who would be affected by the declaratory judgment
20. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7541(b) (Purdon Supp. 1982) which
provides that "[t]he General Assembly finds and determines that the principle
rendering declaratory relief unavailable in circumstances where an action at law
or in equity or a special statutory remedy is available has unreasonably limited
the availability of declaratory relief and such principle is hereby abolished."
21. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6133 (Purdon 1982):
In any matter subject to this subchapter in which paternity, parentage or
identity of a child is a relevant fact, the court upon its own initiative or
upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person whose blood is in-
volved may, or upon motion of any party to the action made at a time so
as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and
alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to
such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity, parentage or
identity of a child against such party, or enforce its order if the rights of
others and the interest of justice so require.
Id.
22. Id
23. 287 Pa. Super. at 196, 429 A.2d at 1168.
24. Id.
25. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7540(a) (Purdon 1982) which provides
that "when declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made made parties
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and




were the mother, child, and McGarrity." The court observed that
if the trial court declares McGarrity to be the father, then none
of the other possible fathers had any rights concerning the child.
If McGarrity is declared not to be the father, then the natural
father's rights are still intact. The court concluded that the Uni-
form Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity gives authority
only to direct blood tests on the parties and no one else could be
properly joined in the action.27
In a concurring opinion, Judge Spaeth noted that the majority
found McGarrity's initial petition insufficient because he alleged
he "may" be the father rather than he "was" the father.28 Judge
Spaeth contended that McGarrity's original petition was ade-
quate. 9 Judge Spaeth stated that instructing the petitioner to
plead something he does not know to be true is contrary to Pen-
nsylvania's fact pleading system that seeks an honest statement
of the issues." He maintained that McGarrity's uncertainty was
sufficient to give him standing to maintain an action. Judge
Spaeth concluded that the petitioner is entitled to know whether
he has legal rights and obligations concerning the child.2
He also agreed with the majority that the trial court does not
have the authority to order blood tests on anyone other than the
mother, child, and petitioner, but he did not agree that if McGarri-
ty is declared the father none of the other possible fathers have
any rights concerning the child.3 Because the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act does not permit a declaration to prejudice the rights of
anyone not a party of the action,' Judge Spaeth contended that
a declaration McGarrity is the father would not bar another
man's declaratory judgment action if he alleges that he may be
the father.3
Although it is unlikely another man would seek a judgment
26. 287 Pa. Super. at 197, 429 A.2d at 1168.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 198-99, 429 A.2d at 1168-69 (Spaeth, J., concurring). Judge Hoff-
man also joined in this opinion.
29. Id. at 199, 429 A.2d at 1169 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
30. Id.
31. Id. See 231 PA. R. CIV. P. 1019(a), 1501, 1601(a).
32. 287 Pa. Super. at 199, 429 A.2d at 1169 (Spaeth, J., concurring). See
A.B. v. C.D., 150 Ind. App. 535, 277 N.E.2d 599 (1971); Kendrick v. Everheart,
390 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1980); Slavek v. Strok, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
33. 287 Pa. Super. at 200, 429 A.2d at 1169 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
34. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7540(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982).
35. 287 Pa. Super. at 200, 429 A.2d at 1169-70 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
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after the court had declared someone else the father, Spaeth
maintained the court should have been specific regarding which
blood tests should be ordered .3 He also suggested that on re-
mand the court should either determine that the tests exclude
McGarrity 4s the father and decide the issue as a matter of law,
or if they do not exclude him, use the tests along with other evi-
dence to establish whether or not McGarity is Jeffrey's father.3 7
Finally, Judge Spaeth noted that a woman does not have an
unqualified right to refuse to cooperate in this type of paternity
action because of the legally protected interest a father has in
his child. Therefore, her right to privacy must yield to the puta-
tive father's right to have his status declared.'
In addition to a declaratory judgment, Pennsylvania provides
several other options for parents wishing to establish paternity.
Declarations of paternity are available, in part, because paternity
proceedings are now strictly civil. Prior to 1978, proceedings to
determine paternity in Pennsylvania were criminal. 9 If the alleg-
ed father waived his right to a jury trial and to the other protec-
tions afforded by criminal proceedings, he could then have his
paternity determined in a civil action by a court of equity.0 The
criminal bastardy proceeding was, however, more civil than crim-
inal in nature because a conviction carried no punishment but in-
stead resulted in an order to support the child. 1
36. Id. See Commonwealth ex rel. Atkins v. Singleton, 282 Pa. Super. 390,
422 A.2d 1347 (1980) (lower court admitted the results of the HLA (human
leukocyte antigen) test, but the issue was not reached by the appellate court).
37. 287 Pa. Super. at 201, 429 A.2d at 1170 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 201-02, 429 A.2d at 1170 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
39. See Commonwealth v. Dillworth, 431 Pa. 479, 246 A.2d 859 (1968) (the
Civil Procedure Support Law did not dispense with the criminal proceeding
which entitled the defendant to a jury trial). The Pennsylvania legislature
abolished criminal trials on the issue of paternity in 1978. See Act of July 13,
1953, Pub. L. 431, No. 95 § 5 (as amended April 28, 1978, No. 46).
40. See Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 220 Pa. Super. 31, 279 A.2d 251 (1971). In
Jacobs, a putative father requested that he not be forced into criminal pro-
ceedings. The court held that he was not required to have the issue of paternity
decided through criminal proceedings, but may have a civil determination
where he would be deemed to have waived his right to a jury trial and the
other protections ancillary to criminal proceedings.
41. See Commonwealth v. Dunnick, 204 Pa. Super. 58, 202 A.2d 542 (1964)
(the court distinguished the offense of failure to support a child born out of
wedlock from the offenses of fornication and bastardy). See 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 4323(c) (Purdon) (repealed in 1978):
Before the trial, with the consent of the defendant indorsed on the bill of
indictment, as now provided by law, or at the trial on entry of a plea of guil-
1982]
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Provisions for determination of paternity are now found only
in the civil procedural support statute. Jury trials are still avail-
able at the request of one of the parties, but the burden of proof
is reduced to a preponderance of the evidence."2 A complaint
under the civil support statute must be filed by one to whom a
duty to support is owing. 3 In the case of a minor child, the per-
son having custody files the petition." In most cases, therefore,
the statute cannot be used by a man to establish paternity
unless the action is brought against him.
In addition, a putative father may himself raise the issue of
paternity under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act"5
through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking custody or
visitation of a child. 6 While McGarrity did not choose to utilize
this means of establishing paternity, the trial court suggested
ty, or after conviction, instead of imposing the fine provided by this title, or
in addition thereto, the court having regard to the circumstances and to
the financial capacity of the defendant, may make an order, subject to
change from time to time, as circumstances may require, directing the
defendant to pay a certain sum periodically, for such time and to such per-
son as the court may direct. The court shall have the power to suspend
the sentence provided in this section, and release the defendant from cus-
tody on probation, in the manner provided in section 4322 of this title (re-
lating to support orders), if the defendant has entered into a recognizance,
in such sum, with or without surety, as the court shall direct, for com-
pliance with such order.
Id.
42. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6704(g) (Purdon 1982):
Where the paternity of a child born out of wedlock is disputed, the
determination of paternity shall be by the court without a jury unless
either party demands trial by jury. The trial, whether or not a trial by
jury is demanded, shall be a civil action and there shall be no right to a
criminal trial on the issue of paternity. The burden of proof shall be by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Id.
43. Id. § 6704(b) states that "[a] complaint may be filed by any person, in-
cluding a minor spouse, to whom a duty of support is owing. It shall be filed on
behalf of a minor child by a person having custody of the minor, without ap-
pointment as guardian ad litem."
44. Id.
45. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5341-5366 (Purdon 1982).
46. See id. § 5343 which defines contestant as "[a]n institution or an indi-
vidual, including a parent who claims a right to custody or visitation rights with
respect to a child. See Burston v. Dodson, 257 Pa. Super. 1, 390 A.2d 216 (1978).
Purported natural father filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking to
establish paternity and obtain custody of the child. The court determined his
paternity and awarded him the child.
47. 107 Montg. County L.R. at 187.
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that it would have allowed McGarrity to petition for writ of
habeas corpus for custody or visitation. s
McGarrity claimed, however, that an unwed father has other
legally protected rights in his child that require a determination
of his paternity regardless of whether the mother seeks support
or whether he wishes custody or visitation. McGarrity specifical-
ly mentioned an unwed father's right to contest the adoption of
his child and the inheritance rights provided for the father of a
child born out of wedlock in the Pennsylvania Probate, Estates
and Fiduciaries Code.49
The Pennslyvania Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania legis-
lature have only recently expanded the right of unwed fathers.
In Adoption of Walker,"0 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck
down the provision of the Adoption Act which did not require
the unwed father's consent to the adoption of his child. The stat-
ute allowed the court to terminate an unwed father's parental
rights without the strict standards which are otherwise required
when parental rights are to be involuntarily terminated.5' The
court stated the only differences between unwed fathers and un-
wed mothers are those based on sex, which is an impermissible
basis for denying unwed fathers rights under the Adoption Act.52
The court held the distinction between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers patently invalid under the Equal Rights Amendment to
the Pennsylvania Constitution.'
In 1978, the Pennsylvania Legislature amended the descent
statute to provide for inheritance by, from, and through a person
born out of wedlock. The child born out of wedlock is now consid-
ered the child of the father when the identity of the father has
been determined.' The amendment to section 2107 of the statute
refers to the Equal Rights Amendment implementation comment
printed at the end of section 2519. This comment discusses the
sections of title 20 which previously contained sex-based lan-
guage and recognizes that section 2107 utilized impermissible
48. Id.
49. 287 Pa. Super. at 190, 429 A.2d at 1164-65.
50. 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976).
51. 468 Pa. at 170, 360 A.2d at 605.
52. Id. at 171, 300 A.2d at 605-06.
53. Id. at 170, 360 A.2d at 605. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
54. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107(c) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). See supra
note 9.
1982]
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sex-based language in considering a child born out of wedlock to
be the child of the mother, but not the father.5
Further, to aid the determination of the father of an illegiti-
mate child, the Pennsylvania Legislature adopted a statute in
1980 which allows the father of a child born to an unmarried
woman to file with the Department of Health an acknowledge-
ment of his paternity accompanied by a consent under oath of
the mother. The Department will then amend the birth certifi-
cate giving the father all the rights and duties as to the child
which he would have had if he had been married to the mother.'6
If the mother refuses to join the acknowledgement, the Depart-
55. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2519 (Purdon Supp. 1982-83):
E.R.A. Implementation Comment
This section previously set different responsibilities for a parent to
meet in order to retain the right to appoint a testamentary guardian foi a
child, based on the sex of the parent. It is changed to require the same
standard for both mother and father.
Three other sections of Title 20 contain sex-based language: Sections
2107, 2514, and 6114, all of which state that "a person born out of wedlock
shall be considered the child of his mother and not of his father." These
sections have apparently been rendered unconstitutional as a result of
Trimble v. Gordon...
The Supreme Court in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), held unconsti-
tutional an Illinois statute which allowed children born out of wedlock to inherit
by intestate succession only from their mothers, whereas a legitimate child may
inherit through both parents. The Court found the statute to be a violation of
equal protection which could not be justified as promoting legitimate family
relations. Id. at 769-70. The Court concluded that the difficulties in proving
paternity in some situations did not justify total statutory disinheritance of
children born out of wedlock. Id. at 770.
56. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982) which
provides
Acknowledgment of paternity
The father of a child born to an unmarried woman may file with the De-
partment of Health on forms prescribed by it an acknowledgment of pa-
ternity of the child which shall include the consent under oath of the
mother of the child. The department shall, upon receipt of the acknowl-
edgment, proceed as provided in . . .the "Vital Statistics Law... and the
father shall have all the rights and duties as to the child which he would
have had if he had been married to the mother at the time of the child's
birth and the child shall have all the rights and duties as to the father
which he would have had if the father had been married to the mother at
the time of his birth. The acknowledgment may also provide for the
assumption by the child of the father's surname or other name desired by
the parents.
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ment keeps the father's name on file and must notify him of any
proceedings brought to terminate parental rights. 7
Unwed fathers have significant substantive rights under Penn-
sylvania's Equal Rights Amendment,' but a determination of pa-
ternity must be made before these rights and privileges accrue.
The declaratory judgment proceeding is clearly an appropriate
means to accomplish this purpose. McGarrity requested a deter-
mination that he was the father of Jeffrey to settle the uncer-
tainty of his legal relation to the child.59
When the present case arose, paternity proceedings could be
instituted only in conjunction with support or custody.' How-
ever, the Pennsylvania legislature and courts have been enlarg-
ing the rights of unwed fathers outside the areas of support, cus-
tody or visitation since 1978,1 and the existence of these rights
depend on the determination or acknowledgement of paternity.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court correctly determined that
McGarrity's potential rights afforded him standing to seek a de-
claratory judgment.
A question left unanswered by Mengel is the protection Penn-
sylvania will afford an unwed father when the state's counter-
vailing interest in protecting the child is more substantial. In
1981, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a putative father
did not have standing to seek custody or visitation of a child
born during the marriage of the mother to another man.2 The
Delaware court found the action was, in effect, a proceeding to
determine the parentage of the child because the putative father
alleged he was the natural father in his petition.' The putative
57. Id. § 8303:
Claim of paternity
If the mother of the child fails or refuses to join in the acknowl-
edgment of paternity provided for in section 8302 (relating to acknowledg-
ment of paternity), the Department of Health shall index it as a claim of
paternity. The filing and indexing of a claim of paternity shall not confer
upon the putative father any rights as to the child except that the puta-
tive father shall be entitled to notice of any proceeding brought to ter-
minate any parental rights as to the child.
58. PA. CONST. art. I., § 28.
59. 287 Pa. Super. at 190, 429 A.2d at 1165.
60. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
62. Petitioner F. v. Respondent R., 430 A.2d 1075 (Del. 1981).
63. Id. at 1076-1077.
1982l
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father claimed the denial of standing deprived him of his rights
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment be-
cause he was entitled to a hearing on the issue of paternity." The
Delaware court determined that a man has no constitutionally pro-
tected interest in a determination of his parental status with
respect of a child born during the marriage of the mother to an-
other man who has not disavowed the child's legitimacy." Fur-
ther, the court contended that even assuming the putative father
has a constitutionally protected interest, it would be outweighed
by the competing public interest. The countervailing interests
cited by the court were the promotion of the marital relation-
ship, the preservation of an existing family unit, and the protec-
tion of the minor child from confusion, torn affection, and the
stigma of illegitimacy.
The United States Supreme Court has not acknowledged a fun-
damental right in the relation of unwed fathers to their children.
In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Stanley v. Illinois,67 held unconsti-
tutional an Illinois dependency statute which excluded unwed
fathers in its definition of parent. After the mother of Stanley's
children died, the children became wards of the state because
Stanley was presumed unfit to raise his children.68 The Court
found the presumption of unfitness that distinguished and bur-
dened all unwed fathers constitutionally repugnant and held as a
matter of due process that an unwed father is entitled to a hear-
ing on his fitness as a parent before his children are taken from
him.69 The Court found Stanley's interest in his children to be
"cognizable and substantial"76 because he had been involved in
raising the children, and stated that the private interest of a
man in his children warrants deference absent a powerful
countervailing interest.7' The Court left unresolved the degree of
protection that would be given unwed fathers when the counter-
vailing interests were more substantial.
64. Id. at 1078. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See also infra
notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
65. 430 A.2d at 1078-1079.
66. Id. at 1079.
67. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
68. Id. at 646.
69. Id. at 649.
70. Id. at 652. Stanley lived intermittently with his children and their
mother for eighteen years. Id. at 646.
71. Id. at 651.
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Recent Decisions
In 1978 the Court decided Quilloin v. Walcott," involving a
Georgia adoption statute which denied unwed fathers the right
to prevent the adoption of their children. The trial court had
granted the adoption petition of the child's mother and her hus-
band without finding the unwed father unfit or the child aban-
doned.7' Determining that the best interests of the child super-
ceded the interest of the natural father," the Supreme Court
held that a state may impinge on the rights of unwed fathers
who do not have a substantial relationship with their children."
Notice to the father and a hearing to determine the best in-
terests of the child are the only requirements the state must
follow.
76
The Court's decision in Caban v. Mohammed7 1 involved an un-
wed father who had a substantial relationship with his children.8
Caban challenged the New York adoption statute which did not
require the consent of an unwed father although it did require
the consent of all other living parents before their children could
be adopted.79 The statute allowed Caban's children to be adopted
by their natural mother and her husband over Caban's objections
simply because he was an unwed father." In its decision, the
Supreme Court used an intermediate level of scrutiny or middle
tier analysis to find that the broad gender-based distinction of
the New York statute were not substantially related to the state
interest of providing adoptive homes for its children born out of
wedlock." The statute was found to be overbroad because it dis-
criminated even when the identity of the father was known and he
72. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
73. Id. at 250-51.
74. Id. at 251.
75. Id. at 256. Quilloin could have gained the right to contest the adoption
by legitimating his child, which he had not done in 11 years. Id. at 246. Further,
although he had acknowledged his child with occasional support and visits, he
had never accepted any significant responsibility in raising the child. Id. at 256.
76. Id. at 253-254.
77. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
78. Id. at 382-83. Caban lived with his two children from their birth, one in
1969 and one in 1971, until the end of 1973. Thereafter he saw the children
every week until the children were taken to Puerto Rico by their grandparents.
He brought the children back to New York from Puerto Rico and retained cus-
tody of the children until the court awarded custody to the children's mother
and her husband. Id.
79. Id. at 385.
80. Id. at 382.
81. Id. at 391.
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had shown significant interest in the child.2 The Court refused,
however, to find that the parental rights of an unwed father con-
stituted a fundamental right.83 The decision in Caban is clearly
limited to unwed fathers who have a substantial relationship
with their children." The court noted that problems of identify-
ing and locating unwed fathers of infants may arise,85 but did not
comment on whether such difficulties would justify a statute di-
rected specifically to newborn adoptions.8
By using the middle tier analysis which is triggered by
gender-based distinction in statutes affecting unwed fathers, the
Court requires a substantial relationship between the distinc-
tions drawn and the state objective in passing the statute. By
refusing to find a fundamental right in unwed fathers, the Court
allows the state to interfere with the rights of unwed fathers
when substantial countervailing interests exist.
These Supreme Court cases make it clear there is no require-
ment that a state protect the rights of an unwed father who does
not have a substantial relationship with his child. The Penn-
slyvania Superior Court, however, allowed McGarrity to seek a
declaratory judgment of his paternity although no substantial re-
lationship with Jeffrey existed. Further, McGarrity did not ex-
press any desire to develop a relationship with Jeffrey as evi-
denced by the fact he was not seeking custody or visitation. 7
The court determined that the rights afforded unwed fathers in
Pennsylvania88 were sufficient to give McGarrity standing to
seek a declaration of paternity to determine his legal relation to
the child. The facts in Mengel, however, did not present the
problem of a countervailing public interest. 9 The question re-
mains whether in Pennsylvania the rights of unwed fathers are
unqualified or whether they may be outweighed by the public in-
terest in protecting the best interests of the child and the integ-
rity of the family.
Maria Verardi Mayercheck
82. Id. at 389.
83. Weinhaus, Substantive Rights of the Unwed Father: the Boundaries
are Defined, 19 J. FAM. L. 445 (1980-81).
84. Id. at 455 n.71.
85. 441 U.S. at 392.
86. Id. at 392 n.11.
87. See supra note 47.
88. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
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